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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2953 
___________ 
 
BEVERLY PRATHER, 
Appellant 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00547) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 18, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, FISHER, AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  September 7, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Beverly Prather appeals an order of the District Court sua sponte dismissing her 
complaint against Eric Holder – in his capacity as Attorney General of the United States 
of America – and the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  Because the appeal 
presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
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I. 
Prather filed her complaint in June 2011 alleging that the DOJ “is deliberately 
allowing the raping of working women as a revenue source to the government, under the 
Violence Against Women’s Act.”  Prather alleged that in 2009, she routinely sought 
assistance from the DOJ, and specifically Holder, to investigate and prosecute her alleged 
rapist.
1
  The DOJ informed Prather that it only had jurisdiction to intervene where 
violations of federal law may have occurred.  The DOJ advised Prather that she should 
consider the following options:  (1) retain private counsel; (2) pursue her claims at the 
State or local level; or (3) retain the services of a legal aid organization. 
In a July 12, 2011 order, wherein the District Court interpreted Prather’s claims as 
arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, the District 
Court sua sponte dismissed Prather’s complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Prather appealed.  Prather subsequently filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the District Court denied on July 28, 2011. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review is plenary.  
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (plenary review of order 
dismissing claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).  A court may dismiss a complaint as 
                                                 
1
 Prather previously filed a Title VII claim in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against her former employer and the alleged rapist. 
The Defendants were granted summary judgment, and we affirmed the District Court on 
appeal.  See Prather v. Prudential Fox & Roach, 326 F. App’x 670, 671 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if the action “lacks an arguable basis either 
in law or in fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
We may summarily affirm a district court’s judgment if the appeal does not raise a 
substantial question.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We may affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  We 
are of course mindful that a pro se litigant’s complaint is to be construed liberally.  See 
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). 
III. 
The District Court properly dismissed Prather’s claims against Holder and the 
DOJ.  Under the FTCA, “[t]he United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”  28 U.S.C. § 2674.  
However, the FTCA also delineates that a party may only sue “the United States,” not a 
federal agency or a federal official thereof.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).  The District Court 
noted that in her complaint, Prather named Holder and the DOJ, and not the United 
States. 
The District Court also properly recognized that the FTCA contains a 
jurisdictional exhaustion component; federal courts cannot assume jurisdiction over 
FTCA claims until (1) the plaintiff has initially presented the claim to the appropriate 
federal agency within two years of the date the claim accrues; and (2) the agency has 
either denied the claim or has failed to make a final disposition within six months of the 
plaintiff’s presentation of the claim.  28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also White-Squire v. U.S. 
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Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2010).  Prather’s complaint does not allege that 
she has presented her claims to any appropriate federal agency.
2
  As such, under the 
FTCA, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over her federal tort claim.  See McNeil v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in 
federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.”).  Accordingly, the 
District Court properly dismissed Prather’s complaint.  Because we hold that the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction, we need not discuss the District Court’s consideration of the 
complaint’s merits. 
IV. 
 For the reasons given in this opinion, we will summarily affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
                                                 
2
 The letters in which Prather submitted to the DOJ did not comply with the 
appropriate regulations.  See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 14.2. 
